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Accident Management for NPPS with RBMK Reactors

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Accident Management for NPPS with RBMK Reactors

Egidijus Urbonavicius
Laboratory of Nuclear Installation Safety, Lithuanian Energy Institute, Breslaujos 3, LT-44403 Kaunas, Lithuania

Algirdas Kaliatka
Laboratory of Nuclear Installation Safety, Lithuanian Energy Institute, Breslaujos 3, LT-44403 Kaunas, Lithuania

Eugenijus Uspuras
Laboratory of Nuclear Installation Safety, Lithuanian Energy Institute, Breslaujos str. 3, LT-44403 Kaunas, Lithuania

Jurgis Vilemas
Lithuanian Energy Institute, 3 Breslaujos str., LT-44403 Kaunas-35, Lithuania


Accident Management is very important for prevention and mitigation of severe accidents in Nuclear Power Plants and is widely discussed in the world. The processes that could occur during severe accidents in vessel-type Light Water Reactors are rather well understood, however, some uncertainties remain. The knowledge about severe accidents is used for development of accident management strategies. Most of the Nuclear Power Plants that operate vessel-type reactors in the world have already developed or are developing severe accident management programs. The processes that could occur during severe accidents in channel-type reactors are not so well understood. The Chernobyl disaster demonstrated necessity to achieve the same level of knowledge and to develop accident management programs for RBMK-type reactors as well.

The book has extensive coverage: * whole spectrum of accidents * the severe accident management guidelines * fundamental safety principle * applied management to prevent accidents and 2) if prevention fails, to limit the potential consequences. It also outlines around the world approaches to the accident Management: Westinghouse Owners Group for Pressurized Water Reactors, Boiling Water Reactors, RBMK-1500 reactors, RBMK-1000 reactors, Ignalina NPPs and others.

The information presented in this book was mainly received in the frames of the project "Development of Manual on Management of Beyond Design Basis Accidents at Ignalina NPP" coordinated by the consortium Jacobsen Engineering Ltd (United Kingdom), SCIENTECH Inc. (USA), and Volian Enterprises Inc. (USA) and sponsored by the UK Department of Trading and Industry.

324 pages, © 2010


1 Introduction. Accident Management at Nuclear Power Plants
2 Specifics of RBMK Reactors Regarding Design-Basis and Severe Accidents
2.1 Fuel rods
2.2 Control rods
2.3 Reactor cooling system
2.4 Fuel channels
2.5 Confinement
2.5.1 Accident Localization System
2.5.2 Reactor cavity
2.6 Graphite stack
2.7 Engineered safety features
2.8 Summary on specifics of RBMK
3 Review of Accident Phenomena in RBMK
3.1 Phenomena before fuel channel rupture
3.1.1 Start of reactor core uncovery
3.1.2 Core degradation before fuel channel rupture
3.1.3 Melt attack to fuel channel and core debris release to the containment
3.1.4 Radionuclide release and transport before fuel channel failure
3.2 Phenomena after fuel channel failure
3.2.1 Energetic phenomena immediately or shortly after fuel channel failure
3.2.2 Phenomena after fuel channel failure in the long-term phase
3.2.3 Containment loads and containment failure modes
3.2.4 Radionuclide release and transport after fuel channel failure
4 List of Beyond Design Basis Accidents
4.1 Deterministic approach to list of BDBA
4.2 Probabilistic approach to BDBA list
5 Simulation of Severe Accidents in RBMK Reactors
5.1 Approach to simulation of reactor cooling system
5.2 Assessment of heat, which could be removed through cooling of CPS channels
5.2.1 Heat removal from graphite stack by CPS channels in case of station blackout
5.2.2 Heat removal from graphite stack by CPS channels in case of large-break LOCA
5.3 Model of accident localization system for COCOSYS code
5.4 Station blackout
5.5 Analysis of large LOCA
5.5.1 Analysis assuming no operator actions
5.5.2 Analysis assuming restoration of core cooling
5.5.3 Release of hydrogen and Fission Products to confinement
5.5.4 Confinement analysis assuming core cooling restoration at 1000°C
5.6 Assessment of core reflooding possibilities
6 Accident Management for RBMK Reactors
6.1 Accident management before SAMG
6.2 SAMG development process
6.2.1 Critical components
6.2.2 Accident management objectives. Safety objective trees
6.2.3 Plant capabilities. Available instrumentation
6.3 Accident management strategies
6.3.1 Reduce pressure in RCS to atmospheric
6.3.2 Water injection to reactor cooling system
6.3.3 Heat removal from graphite through CPS cooling circuit
6.3.4 Isolation of RCS leak (rupture)
6.3.5 Water supply to under-reactor compartment
6.3.6 Reduce coolant release to reactor cavity
6.3.7 Decrease pressure in reactor cavity through special ventilation and system of gas release purification
6.3.8 Heat removal from ALS
6.3.9 Ventilation of accident localization system tower
6.3.10 Water supply to BSRC sprays
6.3.11 Decrease water level in air release section to 1 m
6.3.12 Nitrogen injection to condensing pools
6.3.13 Injection of base to condensing pools and hot condensate chamber
6.3.14 ALS isolation
6.3.15 Isolation of emergency compartments
6.3.16 Artesian water injection via the fire fighting taps
6.4 Ignalina NPP modification for accident management
6.5 Accident management after SAMG
6.6 Examples of accident management measures for RBMK reactors
6.6.1 Transient with steam relief available, no ECCS, except hydro-accumulators
6.6.2 Large LOCA with failure of the ALS, which leads to failure of ECCS pumps
6.6.3 Transient without scram, MCPs are tripped
6.6.4 Large LOCA, o ECCS except hydro-accumulators
7 In Conclusion